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MEDICAID EXPANSION, CROWD-OUT, AND LIMITS OF 
INCREMENTAL REFORM 
JOHN V. JACOBI* 
Medicaid is the cornerstone of America’s efforts to bring health insurance 
coverage to the poor and disabled.  It anchors the public side of our mixed 
public-private system, which seeks to provide coverage for the poor, elderly 
and disabled, leaving all others to obtain coverage through private markets.  
But this system has an enormous gap: 45 million Americans are covered 
neither by public nor private insurance.  Even in prosperous times, that gap is 
growing.  In the absence of national interest in a dramatic shift in health 
finance, our mixed public-private system must adjust to reverse, or at least 
keep up with this trend.  No health finance task is more important, as those 
without insurance coverage suffer increased risk of sickness and earlier death, 
as well as exposure to impoverishment caused by health expenditures. 
Incremental efforts over the past fifteen years have attempted reform 
within the public-private system by targeting relief to those in the gap between 
private coverage and existing public programs.  Medicaid, along with its new 
sister program, Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), has played a 
central role in the legislative attempts to knit together more closely the 
American system of health coverage.1  The reality of growing ranks of 
uninsured low-income families has sparked further interest in incremental 
reform through public program expansion.  As with past efforts, these reforms 
seek to provide coverage for low-income uninsured, while maintaining the 
private employment-based insurance system as the dominant source of health 
coverage.2 
This Article examines one potentially significant factor determining the 
success of incremental reform: the problem of the displacement of private 
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Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Sara Rosenbaum and Sidney Watson.  I wish to thank Louise Trubek for 
her valuable assistance.  I am also grateful to Alexander R. Shekhdar for his research assistance.  
Any errors are my own. 
 1. See infra notes 43-44. 
 2. See discussion infra Part II. 
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coverage by public program expansion.  Efforts to reduce uninsurance by 
expanding public programs is demonstrably displacing private coverage to a 
small, but probably growing degree.  Crowd-out, as this displacement is 
known, occurs at the boundaries between public and private systems.3  As 
public programs expand, some of the new beneficiaries are not long-time 
uninsured, but rather are workers or their dependents who drop or forego 
private coverage.  This displacement of private coverage raises the price of 
incremental reform, and marginally weakens the private insurance system. 
This displacement is a minor problem today.  Recent attempts to expand 
public insurance have been troubled more by a shortage of applicants than by 
massive flight from private coverage.4  In the near term, displacement of 
private coverage is unlikely to rise to levels high enough to justify public 
policy concern.  However, Congress has mandated a study of the issue in 
connection with one recent expansion, CHIP.5  While state and federal officials 
have been diverted to the more important task of identifying, enrolling and 
retaining eligible children, the issue of displacement has received little 
attention.  However, the studies are likely to bring the issue back to the 
forefront if officials overreact to reports of some level of crowd-out.  It is one 
thesis of this Article that such overreaction can be avoided if officials 
anticipate some reasonable level of crowd-out and respond to its emergence 
proportionately and reasonably. 
The second thesis of this Article is that crowd-out serves as a true marker 
of a fundamental fault in our mixed health finance system, and that the 
phenomenon of crowd-out challenges the notion that we are well-served by 
shoring-up the private employment-based system as our dominant source of 
coverage.  It is a tenet of incrementalism that the rate of uninsurance may be 
reduced through government subsidization of health insurance for those near 
the border between public programs and private coverage.  For this to be done 
“efficiently” (without eroding private coverage and minimizing the public cost 
of expanding coverage), those with access to private coverage must be barred 
from the new opportunities for public subsidy.  But, as the cost-sharing 
obligations of insured low-income workers increase, barriers to enrollment in 
public plans are ineffective unless draconian, and if draconian, they seem to 
clash with the fundamental goals of equitable access to government subsidy 
and reliable and continuous access to insurance coverage for all Americans.  
Therefore, the now-minor problem of crowd-out signals an opportunity to 
reconsider the fundamental mix of private and public coverage in our health 
finance system. 
 
 3. See discussion infra Part II. 
 4. See infra notes 80-103. 
 5. See infra notes 133-36. 
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Part I of this Article describes the trend of increased uninsurance and 
discusses why this trend poses a significant public policy problem.  It then 
discusses the current incrementalist strategy of expanding public programs to 
reduce uninsurance.  Part II describes crowd-out as a phenomenon by which 
insurance expansion efforts exhibit less than surgical precision, displacing 
private insurance to some extent.  Part III evaluates the significance of crowd-
out, arguing that crowd-out is best understood in the near term as a minor 
wrinkle in an otherwise smooth course of incremental reform.  It goes on to 
argue that crowd-out may be seen as more than a technical glitch in public 
program expansion, but instead reveals substantial faults in our public-private 
finance system.  Ultimately, if workplace economics continues to cause 
shrinkage in the rate of employment-based coverage, public programs may be 
forced from their current stop-gap role to one of the dominant sources of 
insurance for working Americans. 
I. THE EROSION OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF 
MEDICAID 
A. The Private Side: The Problem of Uninsurance 
It is tempting to permit the numbers to speak for themselves when 
discussing modern health coverage trends.  The percentage of non-elderly 
Americans without health coverage rose from 13.8% in 1977 to 19.2% in 
1996,6 and the trend has continued.7  Those living below the poverty level 
fared the worst, with thirty-five percent of the non-elderly uninsured,8 but the 
“near-poor” fared little better, at thirty-two percent.9  Even these numbers tend 
to underestimate the extent of the problem.  Many people not counted among 
the ranks of the uninsured nevertheless suffer breaks in health coverage.  
About 71.5 million Americans were without health insurance for some portion 
of 1998.10  In addition, a large and growing number of families—perhaps as 
 
 6. Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental System Under 
Scrutiny, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 71. 
 7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 
1999 WITH HEALTH AND AGING CHARTBOOK 14 (1999) (reporting that the total percentage 
(including the elderly) uninsured rose from 15.6% in 1996 to 16.1% in 1997). 
 8. See ELLEN O’BRIEN & JUDITH FEDER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ITS DECLINE: THE 
GROWING PLIGHT OF LOW-WAGE WORKERS (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/contents/ 
1999/2134/2801plightoflowwageworkers.pdf. 
 9. Id.  The “near poor” have incomes between 100% and 199% of poverty.  Id. 
 10. Robert Kuttner, The American Health Care System: Health Insurance Coverage, 340 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 163, 164 (1999).  See Stuart H. Altman et al., Healthcare for the Poor and 
Uninsured: An Uncertain Future, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE 
FOR THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 2-3 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE 
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many as those without any coverage— are “underinsured,” meaning that their 
insurance does not protect them from spending ten percent or more of their 
family income on health care.11 
The lack of health insurance is more than a financial matter.  It is a matter 
of health, and indeed of life and death.  “A substantial body of literature 
demonstrates that people without health insurance are less likely to seek 
medical care, less likely to get it, and, as a result, are likely to experience 
worse health and higher death rates than people who have insurance 
protection.”12  The problems raised by uninsurance are particularly acute for 
children, for whom the lack of insurance means deprivation of preventive care 
such as routine diagnostic and screening examinations and immunizations, as 
well as care for chronic childhood conditions such as asthma and ear 
infections, at a time when such deprivation will have maximum impact on 
physical and cognitive development.13 
The statistics on uninsurance spell at least short-term problems for 
American workers and their families.  The longer-term issues revolve around 
the reasons for this decrease in private insurance coverage, and the prospects 
for future improvement, or, alternatively, further erosion in employment-based 
coverage.  The ranks of the uninsured are swollen with low-income workers 
who are either not offered insurance, or are offered it on terms that require a 
level of cost sharing that they cannot, or will not, meet.  The uninsured 
 
FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM] (“[N]early 24% of those interviewed in March 1995 had 
been uninsured in the week prior to the interview.  Among those under age 65, this number jumps 
from 24% to nearly 27% . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 11. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: R.I.P., in THE FUTURE U.S. 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 325 (“To be uninsured means that gaps in coverage 
leave an insured family exposed to a significant risk of losing a large fraction of its income to 
illness.”).  See Kuttner, supra note 10, at 165-66 (reporting rising rates of uninsurance, defined as 
gaps in insurance coverage leading to out-of-pocket expenditures of ten percent or more of family 
income on health care). 
 12. Diane Rowland et al., Uninsured in America: The Causes and Consequences, in THE 
FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 25.  See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DOES HEALTH INSURANCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE? BACKGROUND 
PAPER  18-19 (1992) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that the activities of health professionals 
in caring for patients may vary in relation to the insurance status of the patient . . . . [I]nsurance 
coverage plays a role in decisions to order procedures or otherwise use health resources . . . . 
[However,] studies which attempt to demonstrate direct relationships between the activities of 
health professionals in caring for patients and the outcomes of that care in terms of patient health 
are scarce.”) (citation omitted). 
 13. Kuttner, supra note 10, at 165.  See Families USA, One Out Of Three: Kids Without 
Health Insurance 1995-96 (March 1997), at  http://www.familiesusa.org/kwohi.html (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2000); Jeffrey J. Stoddard et al., Health Insurance Status and Ambulatory Care for 
Children, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1421 (1994). 
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overwhelmingly (seventy-three percent)14 are in families with at least one full 
time worker,15 most of whom work in low-wage jobs.16  The problem of 
uninsurance therefore increasingly concerns the working poor, and not only the 
destitute unemployed.17 
Several closely-related trends converge to explain the erosion of insurance 
coverage among the working poor.  The cost of employee health coverage has 
risen in relation to background inflation over the last fifteen years.18  This 
inflationary trend flattened in the mid-1990s,19 due in part to the one-time 
effects of the general shift to managed care financing.20  In more recent years, 
 
 14. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 2.  Eighty-five percent of the uninsured live in 
families with at least one full or part-time worker.  Id. 
 15. Id.  Seventy-nine percent of uninsured persons with family incomes between 100% and 
199% of the poverty level live in a family with at least one full-time worker; 90% of the 
uninsured near-poor live in families with at least one full-time or part-time worker.  Id. 
 16. Id. at 2.  See JOHN HOLAHAN & NIALL BRENNAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHO ARE 
THE ADULT UNINSURED? 4 (2000), available at http://www.newfederalism.urban.org/htm/ 
series_b/b14/b14.htm (only twenty-one percent of low income (i.e., income below 200% of the 
federal poverty level) live in families without a worker). 
 17. One group of the very poor has not benefited from recent Medicaid expansions: childless 
adults without permanent and total disabilities remain outside the reach of federal public 
insurance programs.  See Rowland et al., supra note 12, at 30. 
 18. Katherine Levitt et al., Health Spending in 1998: Signals of Change, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2000, at 125. 
 19. Id. at 124-25. 
 20. See Kuttner, supra note 10, at 166-67 (“Although managed care dramatically reduced the 
inflation in health insurance costs for employers in the mid-1990s, this seems to have been a one-
time savings.  The underlying demographic and technological trends are unchanged, and 
employers and benefit consultants report sharply rising premiums in 1999.”).  The cost-savings 
derived from the general adoption of managed care financing flowed from the superior ability of 
managed care plans to bargain with health care providers for price savings.  The savings are “one-
time” in the sense that the benefits of this bargaining with respect at least to hospital and other 
institutional services seem to have squeezed about as much marginal benefit to the plan as can be 
reached without seriously challenging the solvency of these institutional providers.  See also, The 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997: A Look at the Current Impact on Patients and Providers: 
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Committee on Commerce 
(2000) (statement of Gail R. Wilensky, Chair, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission), 
available at http://com-notes.house.gov/cchear/hearings106nsf (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) 
(although hospital revenues have suffered from federal reimbursement changes, three-quarters of 
the decline in margin from 1997 to 1998 are attributable to payment policies of private managed 
care plans; reductions in margin are sufficient to trouble financial markets); Peter Wehrwein, 
Follow the Shrinking Managed Care Savings, MANAGED CARE MAG., Jan. 1999, at 32 (managed 
care has squeezed out excess cost in health care delivery, is now casting about to achieve savings 
through other means).  That the savings are “one-time” is not to minimize their importance.  If, as 
it appears, health insurance inflation is returning (mostly due to factors beyond the control of 
managed care, including the aging of the population and the continuing development of 
efficacious new pharmaceuticals and technologies), costs will at least rise from a lower cost base 
as a result of the savings realized by managed care. 
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however, health insurance inflation is back, with premium increases that 
approach the double-digit levels of the early 1990s.21  As a result of this 
inflation, employers are facing sharply increasing costs for employee health 
coverage.22 
At the same time, the American workplace is changing in ways that have 
made health coverage for low-wage workers less available.  Jobs in the “new 
economy,” although increasing in number, have shifted slowly from large to 
small firms, from full-time to part-time jobs and from manufacturing to 
personal services.23  As a result, the increase in the number of jobs in this 
economy does not translate into broad economic advancement for the working 
poor.  One other important change in the workplace in recent years has been 
the growing gap in income between the rich and poor.  Since 1980, while the 
real (inflation adjusted) income of the wealthiest rose, the income levels of 
families in the bottom twenty percent of income distribution fell in inflation-
adjusted terms.24  The experience of falling real wages was visited with 
particular force on less educated workers, who will be unable to advance in an 
increasingly information-based and technology-hungry economy.25 
 
 21. See JOEL E. MILLER, NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, DEJA VU ALL OVER 
AGAIN: THE SOARING COST OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMERS 
AND EMPLOYERS 5-7 (2000), available at http://www/nchc.org/survey.html (n.d.); Levitt et al., 
supra note 18, at 131-32. 
 22. Levitt et al., supra note 18, at 131-32. 
 23. Kuttner supra note 10, at 167; Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: 
The Accidental System Under Scrutiny, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 72. 
 24. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 12 (“Between 1979 and 1995, the average real wage 
stagnated and wage inequality increased as high-wage workers received real gains, while the 
remainder of the wage structure fell . . . . [R]eal wages declined for lower paid and less-educated 
men and women, as well as for workers in low-skill occupations, while real wages rose for highly 
paid and more educated workers and those in high-skill occupations.”).  See PAUL KRUGMAN, 
PEDDLING PROSPERITY 130-35 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1994) (noting that the income of the 
families in the top one percent doubled from 1977-1989, while that of families in the bottom forty 
percent fell). 
 25. Joel F. Handler, Low-Wage Work “As We Know It”: What’s Wrong/What Can Be Done, 
in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 4 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie 
White eds. 1999) [hereinafter HARD LABOR]. 
The principal reason for the growing inequality and poverty is the decline in the real 
earnings of the less skilled, less educated workers over the past twenty-five years.  In 
1973, for men, with one to three years of high school, the median income was $24,079 
(1989 dollars); in 1989, it was $14,439.  For men with a high school diploma, income 
dropped from $30,252 to $21,650.  For women, with one to three years of high school, the 
median earnings were $7,920 in 1973; by 1989, they dropped to $6,752.  For women with 
a high school degree, the figures were $11,087 (1973) and $10,439 (1989).  Furthermore, 
the decline in income was not due to the shift in jobs from manufacturing to service; the 
real wages declined in both sectors. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Low-wage and less educated men experienced the largest drop in real wages.  
The lowest-paid men (the bottom 20 percent of male wage earners) saw their 
real wages fall by 17 percent between 1979 and 1995, while real wages 
increased by one percent for the top 20 percent of men.  Earnings declined 
precipitously for less educated men.  Wages for men with less than a high 
school education dropped by 27 percent and wages for high school graduates 
dropped 17 percent.  In contrast, wages for male college graduates rose.  
Similarly, men in professional occupations saw their wages rise, while men in 
low-skilled jobs experienced real wage declines.26 
Coupled with the loss of real wages, low-income workers have lost ground 
in employment-based health coverage.  In 1996, 93.4% of high-wage workers27 
were offered health benefits by their employers, while only 42.7% of low-wage 
workers28 were offered coverage.29  This gap had grown substantially in just 
the ten years from 1987 to 1996.  The offer rate for high-wage workers rose 
from 87.1% to 93.4%, while the offer rate for low-wage workers fell from 
43.4% to 42.7%.30  But even among low-wage workers, the loss of coverage 
has been uneven.  Full-time workers with twelve months or more tenure in 
their jobs have tended to continue to be offered coverage, while “peripheral”31 
workers—newer full-time workers and part-time workers—are less likely to be 
offered coverage than were similarly situated workers in the past.32  This trend 
seems ominous, as the “new economy” encourages workers frequently to 
change jobs, and to accept part-time employment.33 
 
 26. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 13. 
 27. “High wage workers” for these purposes are workers earning more than $15.00 per hour 
in 1996 dollars.  See Phillip F. Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers 
for Employment-Based Health Insurance: 1987 And 1996, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 145. 
 28. “Low wage worker” for these purposes are workers earning less than $15.00 per hour in 
1996 dollars.  See id., at 145. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Henry S. Farber & Helen Levy, Recent Trends in Employment Sponsored Health 
Insurance Coverage: Are Bad Jobs Getting Worse?, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 93, 94 (2000) (defining 
“peripheral” jobs). 
 32. See id. at 102. 
 33. One recent study suggests that the extremely tight labor market of the late 1990s has 
produced a increase in the number of persons covered by employment-based insurance.  John 
Holahan & Johnny Kim, Why Does The Number Of Uninsured Americans Continue to Grow?, 
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2000, at 194.  This upturn, however, was largely explained by the 
movement of previously unemployed persons into employment, and does not suggest a change in 
the likelihood that those with jobs would obtain coverage.  Id. at 194-95.  The phenomenon 
seems, therefore, to be related to an extremely high rate of employment, and not to any dramatic 
shift in the likelihood that an employed person will be offered or accept health insurance.  As 
America is near full employment levels, the increase of employment-based coverage by virtue of 
an increase in the rate of employment cannot continue.  A flattening or downturn in the economy 
would, then, contribute to perhaps a quite steep drop in employment based-coverage.  See id. at 
196. 
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Another tool used by employers reacting to increases in health premiums 
has been the increasing imposition of employee cost-sharing for health 
coverage.  The effect of this trend has been to exacerbate the disparity in health 
coverage by discouraging low-wage workers from accepting private coverage 
even when it is offered.  There has been a striking fall-off in the rate at which 
workers opt for, or “take up” employment-based insurance.  As the price of 
health coverage has risen, employers have, in addition to reducing access to 
coverage, increased employees’ share of health premiums.34  In addition to the 
simple goal of cost savings, employers have increased the employee share of 
premiums to encourage workers to take advantage of other opportunities for 
coverage—including the opportunity for coverage as a dependent under a 
spouse’s policy.35  The increase in cost-shifting from employer to employee 
has been dramatic in recent years. 
Between 1985 and 1995, the proportion of workers making no direct 
contribution to premiums for worker-only coverage dropped by 30 percentage 
points, from 64 percent to 33 percent, and workers’ average monthly 
contributions increased as workers paid a larger share of higher premiums.  In 
fact, workers’ contributions increased more rapidly than premiums.36 
The employee share of premium for dependent coverage was even higher.  
The sample costs of family coverage in one recent study found that the 
employee share was three times higher than the employee share for worker-
only coverage,37 with the employee responsible for a higher percentage of the 
total premium cost for family than single coverage.38 
The increase in cost-sharing affects low-wage workers most drastically.39  
That this should be so is hardly surprising, as a worker earning $15,000 per 
year is less able to cover increasing monthly health premiums than one earning 
$40,000 per year.  The effect was demonstrated in a recent study comparing 
insurance take-up by income level for the years 1987 and 1996: 
For workers earning less than seven dollars per hour (in 1996 dollars), offer 
rates were virtually the same in both years, but access rates declined 
significantly.  Offer rates and access rates for high-wage workers (those 
earning more than ten dollars per hour) increased over the same period.  The 
disparity in both individual and family take-up rates by wages was also greater 
 
 34. O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 17; THOMAS RICE ET AL., THE KAISER COMMISSION 
ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, TRENDS IN JOB-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 31-
32 (1998), available at www.kff.org; Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 147. 
 35. See David Dranove et al., “Competition” Among Employers Offering Health  Insurance, 
19 J. HEALTH ECON. 121, 137-38 (2000). 
 36. RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 32. 
 37. Id. at 64 tbl.A-10. 
 38. Id. at 63-64 (comparing Table A-7 with Table A-10). 
 39. See Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Explaining the Decline in Health Insurance 
Coverage, 1979-1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 36-37. 
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in 1996, with workers earning ten dollars or less per hour having greater 
declines in take-up rates over the time period than higher-wage workers had.40 
Low-income workers simply have too many preexisting calls on their income 
to add substantial health insurance cost sharing.  Studies performed in the 
1990s of low-income workers who were offered subsidized health coverage 
suggests a direct relationship between the level of cost sharing and the rate at 
which the offer was taken up.  As cost sharing exceeded nominal amounts, 
low-income families quickly found themselves unable or unwilling to divert 
funds to health insurance.41 
In sum, the erosion of health coverage among low-income workers is not a 
matter of isolated happenstance, but rather is explicable in terms of those 
workers’ position in relation to long-term trends in the labor market.  First, the 
cost of health coverage is rising at a rate well beyond both background 
inflation and wage inflation, after a lull in the mid-1990s.  In addition, 
employers are responding to these increases by reducing the availability of 
health coverage, particularly to part-time and new full-time workers, and 
increasing employee responsibility for health premiums for those to whom 
they continue to offer coverage.  Simultaneously, the wages of low-income 
workers have been stagnant or declining in real terms for decades; therefore, 
these workers are less able to meet the growing demands for health benefits 
cost sharing.  Under these circumstances, low-income workers are, in 
unprecedented numbers, either not offered coverage or are declining it due to 
high cost.  As a result, a cascade of circumstances have come together to drive 
large numbers of low-income workers and their families from private 
insurance, and there is no indication that these forces will abate in the near 
future.  The employment-based health insurance system is simply failing low-
income workers. 
 
 40. Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 146. 
 41. See ANNE MARKUS ET AL., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND 
POLICY, CHIP, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE 
LITERATURE 6-7 (1998).  Low income families, although eager to protect themselves from the 
cost of uninsured coverage, were influenced in their rate of take up by two factors: “(1) the 
amount of disposable income they have to spend on health insurance as opposed to other goods 
(e.g., food, clothing); and (2) the price of the coverage (the premium).”  Id. at 6.  One study 
included in the report found that uninsured low income families enrolled in subsidized coverage 
at a rate of fifty-seven percent if premium was set at one percent of income, at thirty percent if 
premium was set at three percent of income, and at eighteen percent if premium was set at five 
percent of income.  Id. 
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B. The Public Side: The Expansion of Medicaid 
The increase in the number of workers without health insurance has 
spurred interest in expanding eligibility in Medicaid 42 or in Medicaid’s sister 
program, CHIP.43  Other avenues have been proposed for exploration, 
including larger systemic reform44 and incremental reform through methods 
other than the expansion of public programs.45  But the public remains wary of 
large-scale changes, and the private market, particularly that for individuals 
and small groups, seems incapable of providing a platform for reduction in the 
number of uninsured despite recent legislative tinkering.46  As a result, many 
proposals for incremental reforms aimed at the working uninsured and their 
families have focused on Medicaid and CHIP expansion.47 
 
 42. Medicaid is Title XIX of the Social Security Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v 
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 43. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program is Title XXI of the Social Security Act 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa - 1397jj (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 44. Bill Bradley, for example, described a comprehensive plan for near-universal coverage 
in the course of his unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic Party’s nomination for President of 
the United States.  His proposal would mandate the purchase of coverage for all children, the cost 
of which would be supported by federal subsidy at lower income level; the subsidization of 
coverage of persons aged 18 through 64 through private markets or the plans available through 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program; and, for those 65 and older, the enrichment of 
Medicare through the addition of prescription drug benefits and social care benefits.  See The 
Bradley Health Care Proposal: America’s Health and America’s System of Health Care, 
available at http://billbradley.com/bin/article.pl?;path=270999 (last visited Aug. 9, 2000). 
 45. See Mark Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing the 
Pros and Cons, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 37-39 (suggesting modifications in the market 
for individual health insurance as a means of reducing uninsurance).  George W. Bush, at this 
writing the nominee of the Republican Party for President of the United States, has proposed (in 
addition to modifications in public programs) modifications in private markets, federal vouchers 
(“health credits”) in amounts up to $1,000 per person and $2,000 per family for the purchase of 
health coverage and expansions in Medical Savings Account programs in order to make health 
coverage more broadly available.  See Helping Individuals and Small Businesses Purchase 
Health Insurance, available at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/domestic/healthcare/ 
points.asp (last visited June 20, 2000). 
 46. See Len M. Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 175, 194-95 (2000).  Recent attempts at “market reform” in the individual and 
small group markets have had minimal if any success in increasing net access to coverage; 
instead, they appear to have made access to coverage better for some (usually the high risk 
enrollees) and worse for others (usually the low risk enrollees).  Id. 
 47. See Al Gore Unveils Agenda to Improve Health Care for America’s Families, at 
http://www.algore2000.com/agenda/agenda_healthcare.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2000) 
(Presidential candidate Al Gore describes as the first two points on his health care agenda the 
expansion of Medicaid and CHIP to cover all children); On the Issues: Helping Individuals and 
Small Businesses Purchase Health Insurance, available at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues/ 
domestic/healthcare/points.asp (last visited June 20, 2000) (Presidential candidate George W. 
Bush proposes to modify CHIP to give states “freedom to innovate and expand coverage of the 
uninsured . . . so that more eligible people can be reached.”); AMERICAN HOSPITAL 
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Medicaid was created in 1965,48 in order to “provide a more effective 
medical assistance program for welfare recipients and to extend medical 
assistance to additional persons with low income.”49  Initially, Medicaid 
eligibility was associated with cash-support welfare programs which were 
targeted at the “deserving” poor50—those persons who were both poor and 
“categorically” eligible: members of families with children and single parents, 
the elderly, the blind and the disabled.51  Medicaid’s eligibility philosophy 
began to shift in the 1980s.  Between 1984 and 1991, eligibility expanded to 
include families with two parents present and to pregnant women and children 
at increasing income levels.52  By the end of the 1980s, Medicaid had emerged 
from its role as an adjunct to cash assistance programs and was available to a 
wide variety of categorically eligible people regardless of their participation in 
cash assistance programs.53 
In the 1990s, coverage moved further from prior welfare roots.54  One 
manifestation of the growing breadth of the public programs is the wide use of 
§ 111555 and § 191556 waivers, the use of which permits states to expand 
 
ASSOCIATION, INCREMENTAL SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVING AND INCREASING HEALTH CARE 
COVERAGE FOR THE UNINSURED (1999), available at http://www.aha.org/about/campaign/ 
1299uninsuredsoln.html (explaining proposal for incremental reform that includes expansion of 
CHIP to include family members of eligible children and expansion of Medicaid to include low-
income childless adults). 
 48. Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v). 
 49. Laurens H. Silver & Mark Edelstein, Medicaid: Title XIX of the Social Security Act—A 
Review and Analysis—Part I, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 239 (1970) (footnote omitted) (citing 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
ADMINISTRATION §1000 (Supp. D.)). 
 50. See Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical 
Utilitarianism and the “Deserving” Poor, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 933, 935 (1995). 
 51. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A 
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 57 (The Free Press 1974)); Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 935. 
 52. See Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 937-39; Thomas M. Selden et al., Medicaid’s Problem 
Children: Eligible But Not Enrolled, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 192-93. 
 53. Tanenbaum, supra note 50, at 937-38; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND 
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND 
ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 3 (Comm. Print 1993). 
 54. See Louise G. Trubeck, The Health Care Puzzle: Creating Coverage for Low-Wage 
Workers and Their Families, in HARD LABOR, supra note 25, at 143, 146-47.  (“Over the past 
decade, the expansion of Medicaid to cover non-AFDC families has broken the exclusive 
eligibility link to AFDC.”). 
 55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  The waivers are referred to as “§ 1115” 
waivers (rather than “§ 1315” waivers because Congress created the authorization for the waiver 
as § 1115 to Title XI of the Social Security Act.  Section 1115 waivers are granted “in the case of 
any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which . . . is likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of” the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a), and are employed by states to avoid 
the rigors of Medicaid’s federal requirements in order to expand the population of persons 
eligible for Medicaid (and thereby permitting states to receive federal matching funds while 
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Medicaid eligibility to the working poor.57  The details of these waiver 
programs vary from state to state.  In the waiver programs, states couple cost-
saving elements with eligibility expansion.  For example, states impose 
restrictions in the choice of a health care provider or mandate enrollment in a 
managed care program, and simultaneously expand eligibility criteria, in order 
to stretch Medicaid dollars to cover more people.58 
A second indication of a broadening scope of coverage for public programs 
was the creation of CHIP.  Confronted with the reality that over ten million 
children were without health coverage of any kind, Congress created CHIP as a 
part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, allocating over $20 billion in federal 
matching funds for the program’s first five years.59  CHIP reaches children 
with a family income above that reached by Medicaid, targeting children with 
family income fifty percent above the limit for Medicaid coverage.60  CHIP’s 
federal financing is through block grants, and it creates no entitlement to 
coverage.61  Its funding and eligibility limitations will likely limit the extent to 
which CHIP will cover those uninsured children; the Congressional Budget 
Office has estimated that it will cover about 2.8 million in all.62  In theory, 
CHIP permits § 1115 waivers to use federal funding to extend coverage to 
families; however, Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) has 
 
exceeding federal limits on financial and categorical eligibility) and to move parts of their 
Medicaid populations from fee for service to mandatory managed care systems.  See PHYSICIAN 
PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 422-24 (1997). 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b),(c) (1994).  The waivers are referred to as “§ 1915” waivers 
(rather than “§ 1396n” waivers because Congress created the authorization for the waiver as § 
1915 to Title XIX of the Social Security Act.  The waivers permit states to avoid the rigors of 
Medicaid’s federal requirements for pilot or experimental programs in more narrowly constrained 
areas than those within the ambit of § 1115 waivers. 
 57. States have also been motivated in pursuing § 1115 and § 1915 waivers of payment and 
eligibility principles by a desire to regularize and restrain costs.  See John V. Jacobi, Mission and 
Markets in Health Care: Protecting Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1431, 1443-47 (1997); Colleen M. Grogan, The Medicaid Managed Care Policy Consensus 
for Welfare Recipients: A Reflection of Traditional Welfare Concerns, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 815, 818-19 (1997); Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: 
Process, Programs, and Policy Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 105, 120 (1995). 
 58. See Ben Wheatley, State Approaches to Expanding Family Coverage, 4-5 (State 
Coverage Initiatives Issue Brief, May 2000); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, supra 
note 55, at 422-24. 
 59. Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 76. 
 60. This understates the expansion of coverage for some children.  The actual income limit is 
the greater of fifty percent higher than the “medicaid applicable income level,” 42 U.S.C. § 
1397jj(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I), or 200% of the poverty level.  42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV. 
1998). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  See Neal Halfon et al., Challenges 
in Securing Access to Care for Children, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 49. 
 62. See Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 76. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] MEDICAID EXPANSION 91 
discouraged these waivers until the programs achieve greater experience with 
the core task of covering children.63 
A third instance suggesting the broadening use of public programs to cover 
the working poor is the provision of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996 (“PRWOA”),64 by which Medicaid eligibility was 
extended for a period of up to twelve months65 for families losing eligibility as 
a result of employment.66  This provision provided, at least in theory, a bridge 
for families on cash assistance, allowing them to maintain the security of 
health coverage through Medicaid as they moved from welfare to work.  By 
permitting state Medicaid offices to “disregard” some portion of family income 
and assets when determining eligibility, PRWOA creates the potential for 
substantial future expansion of Medicaid to working families.67  Thus, 
Medicaid was again uncoupled from welfare, further emphasizing that 
Medicaid had become a “health insurance program for low-income families.”68 
In the absence of more comprehensive reforms to provide coverage for the 
working poor, expansions of public programs are likely to form at least a 
substantial basis for future efforts to reduce the rate of uninsurance.69  Several 
 
 63. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND 
HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES ARE EVOLVING 10-11 (1999) (“Although title XXI provides the 
opportunity for section 1115 waivers of title XXI requirements, HCFA will not consider such 
waivers unless a state’s CHIP program has (1) been operational for at least 1 year and (2) 
completed an evaluation.  HCFA’s position reflects its belief that it is reasonable for the states to 
have experience in operating their new title XXI programs before designing and submitting 
demonstration proposals.”). 
 64. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396u-1(c)(1) (Supp. III 1997). 
 65. In addition, nine states have received federal waivers permitting them to extend 
Medicaid eligibility beyond the twelve month period.  See Families USA, Losing Health 
Insurance: The Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform (1999), at http://www.familiesusa. 
org/uninten.htm [hereinafter Losing Health Insurance]. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. §1396r-6(a) (1994). 
 67. See Wheatley, supra note 58, at 2-3. 
 68. Families USA, Go Directly to Work, Do Not Collect Health Insurance: Low-Income 
Parents Lose Medicaid (2000), at http://www.familiesusa.org/pubs/gowrk.htm (n.d.) [hereinafter 
Go Directly to Work]. 
 69. To clarify, future incremental reforms are likely to expand eligibility for public 
programs.  Recent welfare reform efforts, including the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, have apparently failed in their intended purpose to 
extend Medicaid eligibility to families as they moved from cash assistance welfare programs.  See 
Go Directly To Work, supra note 68, at 22; BOWEN GARRETT & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE URBAN 
INSTITUTE, WELFARE LEAVERS, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 4 
(2000); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN 
SERVICES DIVISION, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: AMID DECLINES, STATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE 
COVERAGE AFTER WELFARE REFORM VARY 33-34 (1999); Losing Health Insurance, supra note 
65, at 2.  In addition, states have been slow to enroll eligible children in the CHIP program.  See 
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Senators have recently proposed the Family Care Act, which would provide 
funding to extend public insurance coverage to the parents of children 
participating in either Medicaid or CHIP.70  Presidential candidate Al Gore 
proposed that CHIP eligibility be expanded from its current basic limit of 
200% of poverty to 250% of poverty, and that children with family incomes 
above 250% of poverty be permitted to buy into the CHIP program, taking 
advantage of its presumably lower premium levels.71  In addition, he would 
“expand CHIP to parents,” permitting working poor families to maintain 
coverage through the same public program.72  Candidate George W. Bush, 
while advocating market-oriented steps to reduce uninsurance, advocated 
modifications to the CHIP program, giving states “the freedom to innovate and 
expand coverage of the uninsured.”73  Current public officials, including New 
York Governor George E. Pataki74 and New York City Mayor Rudolph W. 
Giuliani75 both formerly hostile to expansion of public health programs, have 
recently advocated expansions of public coverage.76 
 
Robert Pear, Many States Slow to Use Children’s Insurance Fund, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at 
A1.  The enrollments of children in CHIP have only balanced the attrition in children’s 
enrollment in Medicaid, leaving no net gain in children’s coverage by public insurance.  See 
FAMILIES USA, ONE STEP BACK 1 (1999) [hereinafter ONE STEP BACK].  The reasons for states’ 
failure to enroll families in these expanded programs, while an issue of great moment, are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 70. See Kennedy Backs Insurance Act For Parents, HOUS. CHRONICLE, July 23, 2000, at 15, 
available in 2000 WL 24498805. 
 71. Al Gore Unveils Agenda to Improve Health Care for America’s Families, supra note 47. 
 72. Id. 
 73. On the Issues: Helping Individuals and Small Businesses Purchase Health Insurance, 
supra note 47. 
 74. See Jennifer Steinhauser, For Giuliani and Pataki, About-Face on Health Issues, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2000, at B1 (“Gov. George E. Pataki, who from the moment he took office has 
sought to hack away the state’s Medicaid budget, recently championed far-reaching legislation to 
help vast numbers of the state’s uninsured population get coverage at the government’s 
expense.”). 
 75. See id. (“Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, whose administration until very recently made 
concerted efforts to dissuade people from seeking Medicaid, the government insurance program 
for the poor, last week announced an aggressive effort to find these very people and help them get 
signed up.”) (emphasis in original). 
 76. Private organizations have also weighed in on public program expansion.  As part of its 
“Campaign for Coverage,” the American Hospital Association advocates expansion of CHIP and 
Medicaid to groups of the poor and working poor now ineligible for the programs.  See American 
Hospital Association, Incremental Solutions for Improving and Increasing Health Care Coverage 
for the Uninsured (1999), at http://www.aha.org/about/campaign/1299uninsuredsoln.html; Robert 
Pear, Insurers Ask Government to Extend Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at A16 
(reporting that the Health Insurance Association of America, a trade association of many of 
America’s health insurance firms, advocates expansion of the CHIP program to cover persons of 
all ages up to the poverty level, and the creation of a voucher program to expand coverage for 
those with family incomes between 100% and 200% of the poverty level). 
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If this emerging political mood in favor of public program expansions 
takes root, the architects of expansion will face many challenges, both political 
and technical.  One of the looming technical problems is crowd-out, the 
phenomenon associated with expansions in public coverage and the concurrent 
reduction in private coverage in the target eligibility group.  The nature and 
extent of crowd-out is the topic of the next section. 
II. THE INCIDENCE OF CROWD-OUT 
A. Crowd-Out in Medicaid 
Medicaid’s original target population—the destitute—had very little access 
to health coverage.77  As Medicaid expansions reached the working poor, with 
incomes slightly above the poverty level, it extended coverage to populations 
with greater, although still modest, access to employment-based coverage.  In 
1997, only 21.6% of adults with family incomes below the poverty level were 
covered by employer-provided coverage, while 46.9% with family incomes 
between 100% and 200% of the poverty level had employment-based 
coverage.78  As the income line between public and private coverage was 
blurred, researchers became interested in the intermeshing dynamics of the two 
systems.  In particular, they wondered about the extent to which Medicaid 
expansions covered the previously uninsured, as opposed to simply displacing 
private coverage.79 
The interest in crowd-out springs from the coincidence of two trends in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  As Medicaid eligibility expanded and enrollment 
increased,80 the rate of private coverage fell, particularly among the working 
poor, and in similar numbers.81  The “essential policy question” posed by this 
coincidence was: “Did the Medicaid expansions cause the private coverage 
 
 77. Most of the truly destitute, of course, have no family connection to employment (and 
therefore no access to employment-based coverage), and no means to purchase coverage on their 
own.  In addition, workers in near-minimum-wage jobs are unlikely to be offered insurance 
coverage.  See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 4. 
 78. See HOLAHAN & BRENNAN, supra note 16.  In contrast to both the poor and the near-
poor, fully 86.3% of adults with family income above 300% of the poverty level enjoyed 
employer-sponsored coverage.  Id. 
 79. Described more completely, “[c]rowd-out is a term that covers two potential unintended 
consequences of the Medicaid eligibility expansion: (1) persons with private coverage drop it in 
order to take advantage of the public subsidy being offered; and (2) some who are uninsured 
enroll in Medicaid rather than obtain private coverage (as they would have under the more 
stringent Medicaid eligibility conditions).” Linda J. Blumberg et al., Did the Medicaid 
Expansions for Children Displace Private Insurance?  19 J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 34 (2000). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58. 
 81. See Lara Shore-Sheppard et al., Medicaid and Crowding Out of Private Insurance: A Re-
Examination Using Firm Level Data, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 61, 63 (2000).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 26-33. 
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declines, or were the two contemporaneous trends independent?”82  
Researchers thought this question significant because crowd-out diverts public 
expenditures from their “intended” beneficiaries, thus reducing the efficiency 
of the expansions.83  More subtly, crowd-out “may lead to fewer improvements 
in access to care,” as funds that are expended to shift coverage rather than 
provide new coverage presumably have a less significant affect on the health 
status of those enrolled.84 
Researchers have employed many methods in attempting to determine the 
extent to which Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted 
in the displacement of private coverage.85  Some of the researchers examined 
cross-sections of aggregate population data (usually from the Current 
Population Survey) to address the issue.86  These researchers observed the 
change in insurance status in the eligible population, and adjusted for the 
effects of other factors (for example, a recession in the economy during the 
study period) to isolate only the substitution effect attributable to Medicaid 
expansion.87  The reported results of these studies were not terribly consistent, 
with estimates of crowd-out ranging from about fifteen percent to about forty-
one percent.88  It appears that difficulties in correcting changes in insurance 
status unrelated to Medicaid prevent more precise results from research using 
cross-sections of population samples.89 
 
 82. Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 35. 
 83. See Esel Y. Yazici & Robert Kaestner, Medicaid Expansions and the Crowding Out of 
Private Health Insurance Among Children, 37 INQUIRY 23, 23 (2000) (“The extent of crowd out 
is an important public policy issue because it reduces the effectiveness of government 
expenditures.  Every dollar that unintentionally goes toward subsidizing previously insured 
children becomes unavailable for use in reducing the number of uninsured, the intended target 
group of the Medicaid expansions.”); Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 34 (“Crowd-out may . . . 
lead to greater increases in Medicaid expenditures than expected as individuals who previously 
had private insurance drop it to enroll in the subsidized public program.”). 
 84. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 34.  See supra text accompanying notes 12-13 
(discussing health-status effect of insurance coverage). 
 85. Detailed analysis of these studies is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a recent 
comparative analysis, see Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83 at 24-26; LISA DUBAY, THE KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION PROJECT ON INCREMENTAL HEALTH REFORM, EXPANSIONS IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND CROWD-OUT: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS (1999), available at 
http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112m (n.d.). 
 86. See DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5. 
 87. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25 (discussing D.M. Cutler & J. Gruber, 
Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 391 (1996)); L. D. Shore-
Sheppard, Stemming the Tide?  The Effect of Expanding Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance 
Coverage (Unpublished paper, 1996); L. Dubay and G. Kenney, The Effects of Medicaid 
Expansions on Insurance Coverage of Children, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 152 (1996).  See 
also DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5-9 (discussing studies of Cutler & Gruber and Dubay & Kenney). 
 88. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25; DUBAY, supra note 85, at 5-9. 
 89. See Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 25 (“Our review of the crowd-out literature that 
uses CPS data has highlighted two points.  First, these studies have not reached a consensus on 
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Another more recent set of studies has produced more homogeneous 
results.  Unlike the cross-sectional studies which examine large swaths of data 
for two time periods and attempt to discern trends from shifts within a large 
population, these studies follow a population over a period of time, and discern 
trends by observing actual shifts in status of the members of the studied 
population.90  The advantages of the more direct observations available 
through longitudinal studies have been described by one of the researchers: 
While cross-sectional data can be used to analyze the impacts of the Medicaid 
expansions, longitudinal data can identify more complex effects of policy 
changes.  By following individuals over time, movements from one type of 
coverage to another can be observed.  To illustrate why this is important, 
consider the following example: When cross-sectional data are used, the 
movement of one group out of employer-sponsored coverage and into 
uninsurance combined with another group moving from uninsurance to 
Medicaid might be wrongly construed to be movement from employer 
coverage into Medicaid.  Such a characterization of these more complicated 
dynamics would be misleading.  To avoid this result, some researchers have 
used longitudinal data.91 
Cross-sectional studies could then read a simultaneous drop in the rate of 
employer-sponsored coverage and increase in Medicaid enrollment as due to 
crowd–out.92  Longitudinal analysis might demonstrate that the gross data 
mask two different trends—the movement of one group of people from 
employer-sponsored coverage to uninsurance, and a separate and unrelated 
group from uninsurance to Medicaid.  The second set of circumstances does 
not describe the displacement of private coverage by a public program. 
The longitudinal studies are not without their methodological problems.  
Researchers do not have the opportunity to interview the test subjects, and 
therefore must infer the effect of Medicaid expansion on the subjects’ change 
 
the extent of crowd-out.  Second, measurement error associated with Medicaid eligibility and a 
lack of appropriate controls for state and time variation in insurance status may have confounded 
estimates of crowd out.”); DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9 (“The inconsistency of the results from 
[two of the CPS cross-sectional studies] is either due to differences in their overall methods or in 
the comparison group used to account for the secular trends.  Notably, each set of authors has 
criticized the other for their choice of comparison groups.”) (footnote omittted). 
 90. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 38; Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 25, 30-31 
(discussing their own results from a longitudinal study, as well as K. E. Thorpe and C. S. 
Florence, Health Insurance Among Children: The Role of Expanded Medicaid Coverage, 35 
INQUIRY 369 (1998) and an unpublished study of L. J. Blumberg, L. Dubay and S. Norton 
(1999)); DUBAY, supra note 85,  at 9-12 (discussing several studies by the same authors). 
 91. DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9. 
 92. Researchers using cross-sectional methods are, of course, aware of this problem, and use 
a number of methods, including regression analysis, to attempt to correct for it.  See id. at 6-8; 
Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 24-25.  Longitudinal analysis has the virtue of at least 
attempting to get at this information directly. 
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in coverage status by comparison to a control group.93  Researchers’ choice of 
control groups against whom to compare the test group’s behavior has not been 
without controversy.94  In addition, “sample sizes for the populations affected 
by Medicaid programs are small in longitudinal surveys compared to cross-
sectional surveys such as the CPS potentially resulting in imprecise 
estimates.”95 
The longitudinal studies have produced results similar enough to each 
other to give rise to some suggestion of validity.  The range of results for 
crowd-out from Medicaid expansions during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
from these studies is generally from about fourteen percent to twenty percent.96  
In a recently-published study, Yazici and Kaesnter reported results from an 
examination of a large set of data on children surveyed in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth.97  The authors reported crowd-out of 18.9% for 
a weighted average of subpopulations studied.98  Another recent study of 
Medicaid expansion in the early 1990s shows an even smaller number.  
Blumberg, Dubay and Norton reported this year that about twenty-three 
percent of the movement from private insurance to expanded Medicaid during 
that time period constituted crowd-out.99  That is, twenty-three percent of those 
moving to expanded Medicaid from private coverage would otherwise have 
continued private coverage, while the other seventy-seven percent would have 
been uninsured due to job loss or other reasons unrelated to Medicaid.100  The 
authors found that no significant percentage of those who moved from 
uninsurance to expanded Medicaid would have had coverage absent Medicaid 
expansion.101  The weighted averaging of those two groups results in a total 
crowd-out rate of four percent.102 
The convergence of the findings in the longitudinal studies permits 
tentative conclusions as to the rate of crowd-out from Medicaid expansion 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This rate seems quite low, permitting a 
finding that at least four out of five of those covered by those Medicaid 
expansions would otherwise have been uninsured.  One study concluded: 
The consistency of recent findings that use a variety of methods and data 
sources strongly suggests that the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s did not cause, in a substantial way, employers to cease to offer 
 
 93. See DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9. 
 94. See id.; Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 26. 
 95. DUBAY, supra note 85, at 9. 
 96. See id.  at 14-15 (gathering results of longitudinal studies in chart form). 
 97. Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 27. 
 98. Id. at 30. 
 99. Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 57. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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private health insurance, nor did it cause families to drop private health 
insurance.  Instead, the results suggest that the expansion of Medicaid 
effectively stemmed the tide . . . of an ongoing deterioration of private health 
coverage among low-income children.  In the absence of expanded Medicaid 
coverage, the number of uninsured children would have been significantly 
greater.103 
The next section moves to CHIP, Medicaid’s sister program. 
B. Crowd-Out in CHIP 
The CHIP program extends public insurance for children beyond the 
eligibility limits for Medicaid.  It targets near-poor children—those over-
income for Medicaid,104 but whose family income does not exceed the greater 
of fifty percent above the state’s Medicaid income level, or 200% of the 
poverty level.105  Studies (some undertaken after the passage of the CHIP 
legislation) have suggested that crowd-out may be more likely to appear as 
public programs reach relatively higher-income individuals.106  Apparently 
reflecting this concern, Congress structured CHIP so as to reduce the 
likelihood of crowd-out, and to mandate the study of steps taken by states to 
minimize crowd-out. 
The legislation creating CHIP, and a draft of implementing regulations, 
evidence legislative and administrative concern that the new public program 
not displace private coverage.  The draft regulations highlight this concern: 
One of the fundamental principles of title XXI is that CHIP coverages should 
not supplant existing private coverage. Title XXI contains provisions 
specifically designed to ensure that States use CHIP funds to provide coverage 
only to uninsured children.  These provisions maximize the use of Federal 
 
 103. Yazici & Kaestner, supra note 83, at 30-31. 
 104. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(b)(1)(B), (C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining “targeted low-
income child” for purposes of CHIP eligibility as being ineligible for Medicaid). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining “low-income child” as 
one whose family income does not exceed 200% of the poverty level); 42 U.S.C. § 
1397jj(b)(1)(B) (describing CHIP eligibility standard as met by either meeting the “low-income 
definition” or living in a family with income that does not exceed the state Medicaid eligibility 
limit by more than fifty percent). 
 106. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 58 (“[T]he fiscal implications of crowd-out under 
the CHIP program are likely to be greater than under the Medicaid expansions.  This is because 
children eligible for CHIP will, by definition, have higher family incomes than children eligible 
for Medicaid expansion in their state.”); Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, Did Medicaid 
Expansion for Pregnant Women Crowd Out Private Coverage?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 
191 (“[E]xtending Medicaid coverage up to the federal poverty level is likely to involve very little 
crowding out and to greatly reduce the number without insurance.  However, extending Medicaid 
coverage above the poverty level may well lead to crowding out, given the greater extent of 
employer-sponsored coverage of the near-poor and the untenable financial burden these families 
may face to retain such coverage.”). 
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dollars.  Specifically, title XXI requires that States ensure that coverage 
provided under CHIP does not substitute for coverage under either private 
group health plans or Medicaid.107 
State plans implementing CHIP programs must contain “a description of 
procedures to be used to ensure . . . that insurance provided under the State 
child health plan does not substitute for coverage under group plans.”108 
Many states had developed some experience in creating programmatic 
barriers to crowd-out through their implementation of pre-CHIP state insurance 
expansion programs.109  These programs have been funded by states, and 
states’ concerns with crowd-out are therefore internally driven.110  Some of the 
mechanisms were aimed at lessening the incentives for individuals to drop (or 
fail to take up) private coverage in favor of public coverage.  The most 
straight-forward mechanisms erect “firewalls”111 between public and private 
coverage by denying access to the public programs to either those with access 
to employment-based coverage with minimal employee contribution 
requirements or those who have been insured within a three or six month 
period.112  States have used these eligibility requirements as a direct means to 
limit public program access to the uninsured.113 
Other mechanisms seem less applicable to CHIP.  For example, some 
states have created plans that omit coverage of inpatient care.114  While this 
 
 107. State Child Health; Implementing Regulations for the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60921 (Nov. 8, 1999).  This Article is concerned with the 
relationship between public and private coverage and issues relating to the substitution of CHIP 
coverage for Medicaid coverage are, therefore, beyond its scope. 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(3)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  See 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60958 
(Nov. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 457.805) (“The State plan must include a description 
of reasonable procedures to ensure that coverage provided under the plan does not substitute for 
coverage under group health plans . . . . “).  One means by which states may expend their allotted 
CHIP funds is to purchase private health coverage of an eligible child and her family, so long as 
such purchase is “cost effective relative” to direct coverage by a public program.  42 U.S.C. § 
1397ee(c)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  A state may not use CHIP funds for such purposes of 
the purchase of coverage by the state “if it would otherwise substitute for health coverage that 
would be provided to such children but for the purchase of family coverage.”  42 U.S.C. § 
1397ee(c)(3)(B).  See 64 Fed. Reg. 60882, 60958 (proposed Nov. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. § 457.810) (crowd-out provisions for state plans purchasing private coverage). 
 109. See Anna Fallieras et al., Examining Substitution: State Strategies to Limit “Crowd Out” 
in the Era of Children’s Health Insurance Expansions (Dec. 9, 1997), at http://aspe.hhs. 
gov/health/reports/hinsubst/front.htm.  See also Trish Riley, Can We Count on the States to Cover 
the Poor and Uninsured?, in THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 
276-77 (discussing state-funded insurance expansion programs). 
 110. See Riley, supra note 109, at 276-77. 
 111. See Fallieras, supra note 109, at Part IV. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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step would certainly give a low-wage worker pause before dropping workplace 
coverage in favor of the public plan, such a program design seems to interfere 
with the goal of providing meaningful health coverage—it simply leaves out 
too much that is essential.  In any event, states’ CHIP plans must provide full 
access to care, including inpatient care.115 
Another tool used to discourage employees from dropping private 
coverage is the use of high levels of cost-sharing.116  States have set premiums 
and copayment amounts to approximate or exceed those imposed in 
employment-based coverage, reasoning that employees would therefore 
perceive no benefit in shifting from private to public coverage.117  CHIP 
programs are limited in their use of such tools, however.118  In addition, were 
CHIP to permit states to impose large cost sharing on working poor families, 
such cost-shifting may limit program participation by families with no access 
to private coverage.  As is described above, high levels of cost sharing in 
private insurance is one of the main causes of low take-up in employment-
based coverage.119 
Other mechanisms are used in the state-only expansions to limit employer 
behavior, and specifically to address employers’ incentives to drop employee 
coverage in favor of their employees’ enrollment in the new public program.  
These mechanisms directly co-opt employers by offering them direct and 
indirect subsidies for providing workplace coverage.120  States have engaged in 
more talk than action in this regard, in part for budgetary reasons and in part 
because this mechanism, depending on its details, actually encourages 
substitution.121  In any event, such subsidy to employers is not a meaningful 
part of the CHIP program.122 
The Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) circulated a letter to 
the states on crowd-out shortly after CHIP’s enactment.123  The letter reminded 
 
 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  State CHIP plans must 
include inpatient and outpatient hospital care. 
 116. See Fallieras et al., supra note 109, at Part IV. 
 117. Id. 
 118. States may not impose cost-sharing for children with family income below 150% of 
poverty, beyond those minimal amounts permitted by Medicaid.  42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(e)(3)(A) 
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  For higher-income children, states may impose greater cost-sharing, 
but the total out-of-pocket expense for all of a family’s eligible children is limited to five percent 
of the family’s yearly income.  42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(e)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (describing high employee cost-sharing as one 
of the main causes of the erosion of employment-based coverage for low-income workers). 
 120. See Fallieras et al., supra note 109, at Part IV. 
 121. Id. 
 122. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (permitting purchase with 
CHIP funds of private group coverage under limited circumstances). 
 123. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations & 
Claude Earl Fox, Acting Administrator, Health Resources and Services Administration, to State 
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states that “[t]he new law contains provisions explicitly designed to ensure that 
funds are targeted only to uninsured, and not already insured, children.”124  It 
advised that HCFA would review state plans “to determine if the State has 
included procedures designed to address any potential substitution 
concerns.”125  HCFA review was vaguely described for CHIP plans providing 
coverage directly to children, and the letter indicated that HCFA reserves the 
right to require modification of state plans should history demonstrate that 
initial anti-substitution procedures were ineffective.126  More detailed advice 
was given for anti-substitution measures in plans proposing the use of CHIP 
funds to subsidize private insurance.127 
The principal mechanism selected by states to meet this challenge has been 
a requirement that applicants be uninsured for a period of three or six months 
before applying for CHIP coverage.128  Data gathered by the National 
Governors Association shows that of the twenty-nine CHIP plans which 
provide coverage at least in part through non-Medicaid CHIP plans,129 twenty-
five seek to prevent crowd-out by imposing waiting periods—intervals during 
which the child was not covered by insurance.130  Of those twenty-five states, 
 
Health Officials, (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chsub213.htm 
[hereinafter Letter to State Health Officials]. 
 124. Id. at 1. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 2. 
 127. Id. 
 128. The HCFA website provides information on all approved state plans. See The Health 
Care Financing Administration, State Children’s Health Insurance Program Approved Plan 
Files, at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chpa-map.htm (last visited July 5, 2000).  In addition, the 
National Governors Association (“NGA”) has produced a report providing detailed information 
on state plans and amendments.  See NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, STATE CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH INSURANCE: ANNUAL REPORT (1999), available at http://www.nga.org/MCH/Annual/ 
Index.asp [hereinafter NGA ANNUAL REPORT].  The crowd-out provisions discussed in the text 
apply to programs extending coverage through separate CHIP programs that reach beyond 
Medicaid eligibility.  See The Health Care Financing Administration, New Jersey Title XXI State 
Plan and Amendment Summary, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chnjfact.htm (last visited 
July 17, 2000); The Health Care Financing Administration, Delaware Title XXI State Plan 
Summary, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chpfsde.htm (last visited July 17, 2000). 
 129. That is, plans that extend eligibility through CHIP-specific plans that are distinct from 
Medicaid expansion plans. 
 130. See NGA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 128, at tbl.15.  Alternatively or in addition, some 
states attempt to prevent substitution by checking independent sources for applicant’s insurance 
and/or employment history.  See id.  All NGA Fact Sheets are available at www.nga.org.  NGA 
Fact Sheet on Mississippi plan (“The eligibility process incorporates the investigation of 
creditable health coverage using data matches and client interviews. . . .”); NGA Fact Sheet on 
Georgia plan (“Employer information also is validated by checks of wage record data with the 
Georgia Department of Labor when available.”); NGA Fact Sheet on Alabama plan (state is 
developing “AL Health Care Information Network, which will operate a master patient index of 
current coverage of Alabama citizens” in order to identify children eligible for private coverage). 
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twenty-two permit the waiting period to be waived under some 
circumstances,131 invariably for circumstances judged to be beyond the control 
of the applicant or family.132 
The CHIP statute requires that states gather certain data, file compliance 
reports and cooperate with federal studies of the CHIP program.133  Each state 
was required to submit a comprehensive evaluation of its program by March 
31, 2000.134  The states were specifically required to address the issue of 
crowd-out.135  The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
in turn, is required to file with Congress, by December 31, 2001, “a report 
based on the evaluations submitted by the States . . ., containing any 
conclusions and recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate.”136  As 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id., NGA Fact Sheet on New Jersey plan (six month waiting period waived if 
“insurance is lost through no fault to the family, such as a layoff”); NGA Fact Sheet on Nevada 
plan (six month waiting period waived if family lost insurance “due to circumstances beyond 
their control”); NGA Fact Sheet on Alabama plan (three month waiting period applies only to 
those who “voluntarily drop private insurance coverage”); NGA Fact Sheet for Montana plan 
(three month waiting period is waived if parent providing coverage is “fired, laid off, becomes 
disabled, has a lapse in insurance coverage after starting a new job, or the employer discontinues 
coverage”); NGA Fact Sheet for Vermont plan (one month waiting period is waived if loss of 
insurance coverage is without “good cause”); NGA Fact Sheet on Wyoming plan (one month 
waiting period is waived if parent providing coverage is “laid off, fired, can no longer work due 
to a disability, or has a lapse in insurance coverage because he/she obtains new employment”). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 1397gg(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 135. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397hh(b)(1)(B)(i), (b)(1)(D) (requiring the report to describe the 
insurance coverage and access status of participating children prior to their CHIP enrollment, and 
requiring the report to describe state activities to coordinate activities of the state plan with other 
private and public sources of coverage).  State plans often included studies and evaluations 
among the mechanisms for addressing the problem of substitution, perhaps in recognition of the 
uncertainty surrounding the issue. See NGA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 128, at tbl.15.  See 
also, The Health Care Financing Administration, Florida Title XXI Program Fact Sheet, 
available at http://www.hcfa.gov/ init/chpfsfl.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (“The State will 
study the Health Kid’s program’s impact on crowd out.”); The Health Care Financing 
Administration, Washington Title XXI Program Fact Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/ 
init/chpfswa.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (the state “will conduct periodic surveys of all CHIP 
households to determine if they had dependent coverage prior to enrollment.”); The Health Care 
Financing Administration, Wyoming Title XXI Program Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.hcfa.gov/init/chpfswy.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (“Wyoming will also monitor 
to determine if crowd-out is a problem.  If the results of monitoring indicate crowd-out is 
occurring, the state will develop and implement strategies to prevent crowd-out.”). 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(2).  The Secretary has contracted with Mathematica Policy 
Research “to prepare background information for the Report to Congress, including a synthesis of 
State annual reports, State evaluations, and statistical data; a review of external studies of SCHIP; 
and an assessment of SCHIP in important areas such as outreach and enrollment, as well as 
access to, and quality of, health coverage.”  See THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
ADMINISTRATION, SCHIP ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT (FISCAL YEAR 1999) 6-7 (2000), 
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is described in the following section, the extent of crowd-out in CHIP is not 
clear, although the short-term and long-term implications for the eventual 
production of this information are quite significant. 
III. THE FUTURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF CROWD-OUT 
A. Interest in Crowd-Out: An Interlude 
The interest in the problems of crowd-out perhaps understandably waxed 
at the time of the creation of the CHIP program.  The early studies of prior 
expansions of Medicaid had produced mixed results, which could give rise to 
concerns that a powerful extension of public insurance above the ranks of the 
truly destitute would produce as much displacement of private insurance as 
coverage of the uninsured.137  Interest had waned two years later.  In the 
Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999,138 
Congress ordered additional studies related to CHIP, but the emphasis had 
shifted from concern over the displacement of private insurance to the dual 
concern that states were failing to enroll children in their plans,139 and that 
those enrolled may have been eligible for Medicaid, a pre-existing program140 
 
available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/children.htm [hereinafter 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT].  In 
1999, Congress instructed the Secretary to file an additional report on the same day.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1397hh(c) (Supp. III 1997), added by the Balanced Budget Refinement Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, § 703(b), 113 Stat. 1537-314, 394.  That report, the product of “an independent 
evaluation of 10 States with approved child health plans,” is to focus on the flip side of the 
crowd-out problem—the problem of the CHIP program reaching too few eligible children.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(c)(3) (describing the matters to be included in the ten-state survey report as 
supplementing the information provided in the report required by 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(b)(2)). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
 138. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1537-314 (1999). 
 139. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 703(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(c) (Supp. III 1997)) 
(requiring federal assessment of state efforts in enrollment, including “[e]valuation of effective 
and ineffective outreach and enrollment practices with respect to children . . ., identification of 
enrollment barriers,” “[a]n assessment of the effect of cost-sharing on utilization, enrollment, and 
coverage retention,” and “[e]valuation of disenrollment or other retention issues.”); Id. § 703(d) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397hh(d) (Supp. III. 1997)) (requiring Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to audit, and requiring the GAO to review and report 
on the Inspector General’s audit, states’ “progress made in reducing the number of uncovered 
children, including the progress made to achieve the strategic objectives an performance goals 
included in the” state’s CHIP plan). 
 140. See id. § 703(c) (requiring federal evaluation of “the extent to which coordination (or 
lack of coordination) between [a state’s Medicaid] program and [its CHIP program] affects the 
enrollment of children under both programs.”); Id. § 703(d) (requiring Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to audit, and requiring the GAO to review and report 
on the Inspector General’s audit for the number of Medicaid-eligible children enrolled in a state’s 
CHIP program). 
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for which the federal government pays a smaller share of cost than it does for 
CHIP.141 
The fact that CHIP would have enrollment problems should not have come 
as a surprise, considering Medicaid, a well-established and familiar program, 
had long struggled to reach millions of eligible but uninsured children.142  
Within two years of its enactment, however, the dominant issue related to the 
CHIP program was its disappointing growth rate.  In 1999, a front-page article 
in the New York Times opened with the following assessment: 
States are using less than 20 percent of the Federal money that Congress made 
available, with much fanfare, for a big new program to subsidize health 
insurance for children in low-income families. 
  Some states say they cannot find enough eligible uninsured children to use 
all of the money that they are entitled to receive.  Critics say many states have 
been slow to reach out to eligible children and sign them up. 
  The program’s slow start and the accumulation of unspent money are 
tempting Republicans in Congress to take back some of the money and use it 
for other purposes—an idea vehemently opposed by Democrats, by advocates 
for children, and by governors of both parties.143 
Demonstrating concern for the slow start-up of the CHIP program, both the 
White House and HCFA announced initiatives to identify and enroll CHIP-
eligible children and to allocate funds to support those efforts.144  In testimony 
 
 141. See ONE STEP BACK, supra note 69, at 20-21 (attributing a simultaneous drop in 
Medicaid coverage of children and increase in CHIP coverage of children in part to the fact that 
“the federal government pays a larger share of the costs of CHIP”); Pear, supra note 69, at B22 
(“But states have a strong financial incentive to put children into the new program, rather than in 
Medicaid, because the Federal Government pays a larger share of the costs—65 percent, rather 
than 50 percent, in high-income states like New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.”). 
 142. See Selden et al., supra note 52, at 196 (“4.7 million children aged eighteen and under 
were uninsured [in 1996] despite being eligible for Medicaid, representing approximately two in 
every five uninsured children in the United States.”) (footnote omitted). 
 143. Pear, supra note 69, at A1.  Others also noted the slow pace of CHIP enrollment.  An 
Issue Paper published by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured stated: 
The recent expansions of children’s health insurance programs at federal and state levels 
offer an unprecedented opportunity to reach out and enroll millions of uninsured children 
who now qualify for publicly subsidized health coverage.  However, even with the 
infusion of new money and resources to get this job done, states and localities have had 
limited success reaching the millions of children who are currently eligible but not 
enrolled for health care coverage. 
DAWN HORNER ET AL., THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, EXPRESS 
LANE ELIGIBILITY: HOW TO ENROLL LARGE GROUPS OF ELIGIBLE CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND 
CHIP (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/docs/sections/kcmu/current.html. 
 144. See Press Release: The Clinton-Gore Administration Takes New Steps to Increase 
Enrollment of Uninsured Children (Oct. 12, 1999), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/ 
whchip12.htm (describing several initiatives to reach out to eligible children, and the funding of a 
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before Congress in 1999, the HCFA Administrator spoke extensively about 
outreach and did not mention any concern for the possible displacement of 
private insurance.145  HCFA’s 1999 Annual CHIP Report to Congress follows 
through on this emphasis, concentrating on identification, enrollment and 
retention of eligible children.146 
Perhaps reflecting the federal focus, states appear to have done little to 
review their programs for crowd-out.  No published source suggests that any of 
the state reports filed earlier this year contained any systematic study on the 
topic, no doubt reasonably concentrating instead on the federal government’s 
more pressing concern of identification, enrollment, and retention of eligible 
children.  Informal surveys of state CHIP programs reflect a disinclination to 
study crowd-out and, often, a disinclination to credit the possibility of its 
existence in their programs.  Most of the CHIP offices contacted had 
performed no studies of crowd-out or believed that there was no displacement 
of private coverage associated with their programs.147  The few states that had 
conducted either formal or informal investigations of crowd-out found levels in 
line with studies of crowd-out associated with previous Medicaid 
 
$9 million project by the federal government and a private foundation to identify outreach 
techniques); Press Release: Children’s Health Insurance Program National Back-To-School Kick 
Off (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/990922wh.htm (announcing 
interagency effort to enroll children in CHIP, and announcing a “$1 million radio campaign, 
funded by HHS, to promote . . . upcoming enrollment activities . . .”). 
 145. The Children’s Health Insurance Program: Testimony Before the Senate Finance 
Committee (Apr. 29, 1999) (statement of Nancy-Ann DeParle, Administrator, Health Care 
Financing Administration), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/init/testm429.htm. 
 146. See 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 6.  The Report makes only oblique 
reference to crowd-out, mentioning that a component of states’ reports to HCFA is the enrolled 
“children’s access to other health insurance coverage prior to and subsequent to their coverage 
under the State SCHIP plan.”  Id. 
 147. Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Gayle Sandlin, Director, CHIP, 
Alabama Department of Public Health (May 22, 2000); Telephone interview by Alexander 
Shekhdar with Joie Wallis, Program Administrator, Division of Medical Services, Arkansas 
Department of Human Services (May 22, 2000); Telephone interview with Linda Mead, HUSKY 
Plan Project Director, Department of Social Services, State of Connecticut (May 24, 2000); 
Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Fran Ellington, Program Director, Medicaid 
Eligibility and Quality Control, Department of Medical Assistance, State of Georgia (May 22, 
2000); Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Diane Moore, Division Medicaid 
Administration, Department of Health and Welfare, State of Idaho (May 26, 2000); Telephone 
interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Susie Baird, Director of Programs, Bureau of TennCare, 
Department of Health, State of Tennessee (May 24, 2000); E- mail from Jane Longo, Chief, 
Bureau of KidCare, Illinois Department of Public Aid (May 24, 2000) (on file with the author); 
E-mail from Ann Rugg, Managed Care Senior Administrator, Office of Vermont Health Access, 
Department of Social Welfare, State of Vermont (May 23, 2000) (on file with the author); E-mail 
from Dedrea McCoy, Department of Medicaid Services, Division of Children’s Health Programs, 
State of Kentucky (May 24, 2000) (on file with the author). 
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expansions.148  With respect to crowd-out and other areas of interest in the 
CHIP program’s development, states appear to be too absorbed in the difficult 
task of bringing a new program on-line to develop a great deal of data.149  No 
national studies accompanied the passage of CHIP legislation, and it will be 
difficult to examine the effects of CHIP after the fact.150  The study recently 
commissioned by HCFA will therefore be of great significance.151 
B. The Implications of Renewed Interest in Crowd-Out 
The expansion of public program eligibility into the ranks of the working 
poor, occasioned by the shrinking private coverage of this group,152 will be 
accompanied by some degree of displacement of private coverage.  Prior 
expansions resulted in some displacement of private coverage, although four 
out of five of those enrolled would otherwise have been uninsured.153  At the 
lower ends of the wage spectrum, many workers are uninsured, while many 
others are not.  For workers with family incomes below 200% of the poverty 
level, the percentage of insured and uninsured workers is about even.154  As 
expansions target near-poor working families, then, eligible persons will 
increasingly have at least nominal access to private coverage.155  These 
expansions, including CHIP programs, will therefore increasingly give rise to a 
clash between the goals of providing coverage for the uninsured and limiting 
public programs to those without access to private coverage. 
The lack of recent attention by state and federal officials to crowd-out, 
described above, suggests a danger of surprise and overreaction when some 
 
 148. Telephone interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Office of Children’s Health Programs, 
Department of Health and Human Services, State of South Carolina (May 23, 2000) (South 
Carolina estimates its crowd-out rate at approximately ten percent of enrollment); Telephone 
interview by Alexander Shekhdar with Susan Moore, Bureau of Health Economics, Department 
of Health, State of New York (May 26, 2000) (New York estimates that its “actual” crowd-out 
rate is between four percent and six percent of enrollment); Facsimile from Chad Westover, 
Administrator, Children’s Health Insurance Program, Department of Health, State of Utah (May 
23, 2000) (on file with the author) (Of a survey of 201 applicants for Utah’s SCHIP program, 
sixty-three applicants, or thirty-one percent, most recently had employer-sponsored health 
insurance.); INSTITUTE FOR CHILD HEALTH POLICY, FLORIDA KIDCARE PROGRAM EVALUATION 
REPORT xiii (2000), available at http://www.ichp.edu/FloridaKidCare/flaKC.htm (overall only 
eleven percent of children had employer-based coverage prior to entering the KidCare Program). 
 149. See Halfon et al., supra note 61, at 58. 
 150. Id. at 56-58. 
 151. See 1999 CHIP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136. 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79. 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 155. That is, more people income-eligible for public programs will at least be offered private 
coverage, although an increasing number of these income-eligible people will decline the offer 
due to the high cost-sharing associated with the private coverage.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 39-41. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
106 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:79 
degree of crowd-out is recognized.  The antidotes to this overreaction are 
awareness and perspective.  The surprise that may accompany the recognition 
of a moderate level of crowd-out in public program expansion is illustrated by 
the recent experience of Rhode Island with its broad public expansion 
program, RIte Care. 
RIte Care began with the filing of an application for a § 1115 waiver in 
July 1993.156  The program began accepting members on August 1, 1994, and 
initially accepted families with children under age six and with incomes under 
250% of the poverty level; the plan was expanded in 1996 and 1997 to cover 
families with children up to age eighteen.157  Pursuant to a CHIP application 
filed on January 5, 1998, RIte Care incorporated CHIP’s enhanced federal 
matching payments for children who would not, absent the § 1115 waiver, 
have been covered by Medicaid.158  The program included anti-displacement 
provisions.  Children eligible under the CHIP coverage must be uninsured, and 
may not have refused or dropped, within the year prior to application, 
employment-based coverage with an employee premium cost of less than $150 
per month for individual coverage or $300 per month for family coverage.159 
Through RIte Care, Rhode Island embarked on a plan to create “seamless 
coverage” for low-income children and their families, combining a state 
program, a § 1115 waiver increasing Medicaid eligibility and a CHIP 
program.160  Through a Medicaid expansion program,161 adults were eligible 
for public coverage with family incomes up to 185% of the poverty level.162  
Pregnant women and children were eligible for coverage with family incomes 
up to 250% of the poverty level.163  This RIte Care expansion succeeded in 
identifying, enrolling and retaining families, and by May 2000 it covered 
 
 156. The Health Care Financing Administration, Rhode Island Statewide Health Reform 
Demonstration Fact Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/rifact.htm (last visited Oct. 
15, 2000). 
 157. Id.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-12.3-9 (1993). 
 158. See The Health Care Financing Administration, Rhode Island Title XXI State Plan Fact 
Sheet, available at http://www.hcfa.gov/int/chpfsri.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000). 
 159. Id. 
 160. State Legislative Agendas Focus on Managed Care and Chip: Potential and Value of 
Further State Reform Debated, 30 STATE INITIATIVES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 7 (March 
1999). 
 161. This expansion provided, beginning in 1999, coverage for adults with income up to 
185% of the poverty level pursuant to a “§ 1931 income disregard.”  See Wheatley, supra note 
58, at 3.  “Section 1931” refers to § 1931 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1 (1994 
& Supp. IV 1998). 
 162. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-16-1 (1999). 
 163. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-12.3-3, 3-4 (1993).  The expanded program for children is 
referred to in the legislation as “RIte Track.”  For ease of reference, and consistent with popular 
discourse, the program will be referred to generally as “RIte Care.” 
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“101,600 low- and middle-income adults and children, about 10 percent of the 
state’s population . . . .”164 
As costs increased beyond budgeted levels,165 criticism of the program 
centered on crowd-out.  A recent editorial in a Rhode Island newspaper 
captured this focus on private coverage displacement: 
[RIte Care] has been wildly successful in bringing health coverage to Rhode 
Island’s low- and moderate-income populations.  But because of a sharp jump 
in enrollments, RIte Care now accounts for more than half of the expected $50 
million increase in state Department of Human Services spending . . . . It has 
done wonderfully well in reducing the numbers of uninsured Rhode Islanders.  
Only 10 percent of Rhode Islanders have no health insurance, compared with 
18 percent nationally . . . . Where have the new beneficiaries come from?  
Well, some 20,000 Rhode Islanders dumped their private coverage to sign up 
for the free state plan.166 
The level of crowd-out experienced by the program was reported in the press 
as approximately twenty percent,167 a rate not jarringly out of line with the 
rates estimated for Medicaid expansions with less generous eligibility levels.168  
The press reports suggested a high level of concern that this level of crowd-out 
was unexpected, and unexpectedly high.169  The press also cited the enrollment 
of state employees (prohibited under state law) as a systemic problem,170 
although this form of substitution accounted for only eight of over  one-
hundred-thousand enrollees, and all had apparently been removed from the 
program.171 
Under these circumstances, Rhode Island officials could have reacted 
favorably, concluding that the aggressive outreach undertaken to promote 
 
 164. Christopher Rowland, Officials Rethinking RIte Care’s Mission, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., 
May 21, 2000, at A1. 
 165. Id. (“The Department of Human Services budget has a projected $50 million deficit in its 
health-related programs; more than half of it is due to RIte Care overruns.”). 
 166. The RIte Care Crisis, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 1, 2000, at B6. 
 167. Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (reporting that “up to 20,000” of a total of 101,600 
people covered by the program in 2000 “dumped private health insurance to take advantage of the 
free state plan”). 
 168. See text accompanying notes 86-102. 
 169. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (“Political leaders scrambling to control the state’s 
budget-busting RIte Care health-insurance program have discovered a troubling trend: up to 
20,000 Rhode Islanders have dumped private health insurance to take advantage of the free state 
plan.”); The RIte Care Crisis, supra note 166, at B6 (“RIte Care now accounts for more than half 
of the expected $50 million increase in the state Department of Human Services spending . . . . 
Where have the new beneficiaries come from?  Well, some 20,000 Rhode Islanders dumped their 
private coverage to sign up for the free state plan.”). 
 170. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (“There have even been a few isolated instances of 
state employees signing up for RIte Care . . . .); The RIte Care crisis, supra note 166, at B6 
(“State employees are not allowed to join RIte Care, but several have sneaked in.”). 
 171. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1. 
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public knowledge of the RIte Care program172 had succeeded in a way that 
would make CHIP programs around the country envious.173  The fiscal 
realities, of course, put the brakes on that reaction.  The high enrollment in the 
program, whether attributable to the success of the outreach program, increases 
in the employee costs of coverage for low-income workers, or other factors 
external to the RIte Care program,174 resulted in the public program’s coverage 
of ten percent of the state’s population, with the program on the hook for twice 
as much, should all those eligible apply.175 
To its credit, Rhode Island did not react to the higher-than-expected cost of 
the program by slashing it and reducing eligibility or services.  The response, 
however, highlights the importance of taking seriously the developments in 
crowd-out in public program expansion.  Rhode Island reacted to what was 
cast in the public discourse as a crowd-out problem, quite predictably, with a 
crowd-out solution.  Initially, the state was determined to move quite 
aggressively to limit displacement of private coverage.  An early draft of the 
amendatory statute, for example, would have barred access to RIte Care for 
employees who refused or dropped coverage if the employer paid more than 
fifty percent of the premium, even if the employee’s share of the premium 
would have imposed a crushing burden on a low-income family.176  The Rhode 
 
 172. See id.  (“The state undertook promotion efforts.  The state Department of Human 
Services won a grant, part of which was used to support the work of thirty-four outreach workers 
around the state.”). 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43 (discussing national concern over the slow 
growth rate of CHIP programs). 
 174. See Rowland, supra note 164, at A1 (describing several factors that might have 
contributed to high RIte Care enrollment, including outreach, the fact that “[e]mployers and 
employees have faced double digit increases in health-care costs for three straight years . . .,” and 
difficulties experienced by Rhode Island’s health insurance companies). 
 175. Id. (“Legislators are nervous about the potential for continued increases.  By current 
estimates, 196,000 could qualify to join RIte Care, nearly double the current number of clients.”). 
 176. See Felice J. Freyer & Christopher Rowland, State Leaders Unveil Plan They Say Will 
Save RIte Care, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 16, 2000, at A1.  The article discussed other 
restrictions for employees with some connection with workplace coverage: 
The new legislation sets a waiting period for certain adults applying for RIte Care, and 
places new restrictions on eligibility for RIte Care (and RIte Share [a proposed new 
segment of the public program applicable to income eligible people with some access to 
private coverage]).  It would bar people whose premium costs are low or whose employer 
pays 80 percent of the premium; people (with a few exceptions) who have refused or 
dropped, within the previous six months, employer-sponsored health insurance in which 
the employer pays more than 50 percent of the premium; and people whose employer 
drops coverage for a class of employees who would qualify for RIte Care. 
 
Additionally, RIte Care enrollees whose income is more than 150 percent of the federal 
poverty level (about 10 percent of the current RIte Care population) would have to pay 
some co-payments and premiums, on a scale based on income.  But those costs could not 
exceed 5 percent of an enrollee’s income. 
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Island Director of Human Services suggested that this and other anti-crowd-out 
provisions would result in the disqualification of about four-thousand then-
current RIte Care participants, and would bar four-thousand people expected to 
apply in the next year.177  Advocates expressed concern that the changes would 
limit access to needed health coverage.178 
The process leading to the passage of the amendatory statute softened this 
hard edge.  In adopting a “RIte Care Stabilization” Act,179 the General 
Assembly reaffirmed its goal of “providing or creating access to affordable 
health insurance for all Rhode Islanders who are uninsured.”180  It noted that 
this commitment to full insurance was not to be interpreted as a turning away 
from the traditional support of “coverage available through private employer-
based health plans.”181  The legislation stands in contrast to press discussions 
of the RIte Care budget problems, and the discussions of an early draft of the 
amending language, which focused on people “dumping” private coverage and 
“sneaking” into RIte Care eligibility.  The introductory language of the 
legislation sets forth a series of findings, which in no way blames the working 
poor of Rhode Island for the program’s unexpectedly high costs.  Instead, the 
findings attribute the costs to “an erosion in access to affordable employer-
based health-insurance coverage,”182 attributable to “escalating costs of private 
health coverage . . . for small businesses,”183 and to “instability” in the state’s 
market for health finance, evidenced by the loss of two major health 
insurers.184  The legislature, in addition, found that the solution to RIte Care’s 
budgetary woes will be addressed by attempting to shore up the private 
employer-based insurance market.185 
The legislation takes only two new steps to address crowd-out in RIte 
Care.  First, it conditions families’ participation in RIte Care on their 
enrollment in any offered employer-based insurance plans,186 but creates a 
 
Id. 
 177. Id. (citing Christine C. Ferguson). 
 178. Id. (citing Marti Rosenberg, of Rhode Island Health Care Organizing Project). 
 179. An Act Relating to Health Reform, R.I. 2000—RIte Care Stabilization, Small Employer 
Insurance Reform, and Health Insurers’ Accountability, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 00-229 
[hereinafter RIte Care Stabilization Act]. 
 180. Id. § 1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. § 1(1). 
 183. Id. § 1(3). 
 184. RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 1(2). 
 185. Id. § 1(4) - (6).  The RIte Care Stabilization Act is predominantly concerned with small 
group and individual market reform, devoting seventeen of the substantive sections to that task, 
and only three sections to modifications to RIte Care itself. 
 186. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(a) which directs the Department of Human Services to 
achieve a plan amendment requiring “eligible individuals with access to employer-based health 
insurance to enroll themselves and/or their family” in the insurance plan as a “condition of 
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premium support program which will pay some or all of the employee share of 
such employment-based coverage.187  The second change was to permit the 
Department of Human Services to adopt regulations subjecting to cost-sharing, 
for the first time, a group of public program participants: those with family 
income between 150% and 185% of poverty.188  The latter provision, however, 
limits the contribution of the low-income family to three percent of income, 
less than the five percent discussed in a draft version of the statute.189 
In the process from the initial public splash about crowd-out in Rhode 
Island to the passage of the legislation “stabilizing” RIte Care, the discourse 
and language moved from knee-jerk to measured response.  There are two 
short-term lessons that can be drawn from Rhode Island’s experience.  First, 
pay attention to the issue of crowd-out.  The issue is not an entirely simple one.  
If the “discovery” that some modest percentage of public program participants 
were eligible for some level of private coverage catches governmental officials 
flat-footed, the press and those hostile to public insurance programs can be 
expected to make out of the discovery some combination of skullduggery on 
the part of low-income participants and incompetence on the part of the 
program’s administrators.  Rhode Island officials, it is safe to say, would have 
preferred to act to create a private premium support component in RIte Care, 
rather than react to assertions in the press that the state was standing by while 
program participants cheated taxpayers. 
The second lesson derives from Rhode Island’s eventual thoughtful and 
measured response.  The response reflects an understanding that public 
program demand is affected by the deterioration of the level of private, 
employment-based coverage, particularly for low-income workers.  It reflects 
an understanding that not all instances of employment-based coverage are 
created equal.  Increasingly, again particularly in the case of low-income 
workers, offers of coverage can be accepted only at a high cost-sharing price—
one that many low-income workers cannot pay.190  The response also reflects 
an understanding that the government’s interest in slowing the erosion of 
private coverage does not overcome the need to be fair about access to 
government subsidies. 
 
participation” in the public program and adding new § 40-8.4-12(f) which directs the Department 
of Human Services to adopt regulations disqualifying for a period of time a person who refuses to 
enroll in available employer-based coverage). 
 187. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(a) which provides for premium support for employment-
based coverage pursuant to the terms of new § 40-8.4-12(b)). 
 188. Id. § 2 (adding new § 40-8.4-12(b)). 
 189. Compare RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 2 (creating new § 40-8.4-12(b)) 
with Freyer & Rowland, supra note 176, at A1 (discussing the draft bill’s inclusion of a five 
percent cost-sharing provision). 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (discussing the increasing incidence of high 
cost-sharing requirements accompanying offers of health insurance to low-income workers). 
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Initially, it was reported that Rhode Island would act to prevent crowd-out 
by taking quite a hard line on the effect of access to private coverage on 
enrollment in RIte Care.191  Instead, the state sought to protect private coverage 
while treating low-income workers equitably.  Under these circumstances, 
equitable treatment entailed permitting low-income workers a similar 
opportunity to obtain and retain insurance coverage, notwithstanding whether 
the worker happened to be employed in a setting in which private coverage 
was offered. 
The principle of equitable treatment does not require government to ignore 
the fact that a low income worker has access to private coverage.  But it does 
require that a worker not be made worse off—less able to secure and retain 
health insurance coverage for her family—depending on the accident of a 
particular workplace’s benefits package.192  Rhode Island eventually broadened 
the scope of analysis beyond what Blumberg, Dubay and Norton call “target 
efficiency,” and considered the fairness—the “horizontal equity”—
implications of RIte Care’s subsidy design.  Rhode Island attempted to hew to 
this principle by encouraging or requiring workers to take advantage of private 
coverage opportunities, while assuring that the state will permit them to do so 
with approximately the same cost-sharing responsibility as a low-income 
worker with the same family income covered by the public program. 
The Rhode Island experience may be recapitulated in Washington and in 
state capitals when formal crowd-out analysis is undertaken of CHIP and other 
recent public program expansions.  The lessons from the Rhode Island 
experience seem to be two-fold.  First, governmental officials and advocates 
supporting public program expansion should be aware of the apparent 
inevitability of the emergence of some level of crowd-out in any public 
program expansion.  As the low-income workplace becomes less likely to offer 
full health benefits to workers and their dependents, public programs will be 
expanded to reach the working poor.  The second lesson is that the response to 
crowd-out—ideally formulated before front page articles appear—should 
contemplate the complex nature of the task of efficiently expanding public 
 
 191. See Freyer & Rowland, supra note 176, at A1 (discussing draft language that would bar 
RIte Care membership unless employer’s share of premium was quite low). 
 192. Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 53-59. 
The crowd-out issue has the opportunity to focus the debate over how society will 
evaluate the success of public insurance programs.  On one hand is the goal of minimizing 
the public cost per newly insured individual (target efficiency).  On the other hand is the 
goal of providing public income support in such a way that people in similar economic 
circumstances receive similar levels of assistance (horizontal equity).  The concern with 
crowd-out, per se, touches only upon the efficiency with which a program targets public 
dollars to the previously uninsured.  While target efficiency is a relevant and important 
component of judging the cost-effectiveness of particular programs, it is not the only 
criterion against which new programs need to be evaluated. 
Id. 
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program access to the working poor.  In reaching the working poor, public 
programs will inevitably be reaching into a demographic group in which a 
large percentage of people have some access to private coverage.  As the 
Rhode Island experience demonstrated, people have understandable and 
legitimate reasons for favoring public coverage over the private coverage 
associated with high levels of cost-sharing.  A response to crowd-out should 
not fight that reality, but should permit the public program to mesh smoothly 
and efficiently with the changing economics of private-sector workplace 
benefits, building in incentives for employers and low-income employees to 
play by the rules. 
The long-term implications of crowd-out in public program expansions 
merit a few words.  Here, we admittedly move onto more speculative ground, 
but, if a few not unreasonable assumptions are granted, the long-term 
implications could be significant.  In particular, dynamics surrounding crowd-
out suggest a diminution of the importance of America’s system of private, 
employment-based insurance and a concomitant increase in the significance of 
public insurance, potentially reversing the traditional balance in America’s 
mixed public-private health finance system. 
The assumptions that underpin this scenario are several—but not 
unreasonable.  First, it seems reasonable to assume that the “new economy” 
will continue to drive a fall-off in access to health benefits for low-income 
workers.  In particular, low-income workers are less likely to be offered 
coverage,193 and, in particular, “peripheral” workers—part-time workers and 
newer full-time workers are less likely to be offered coverage.194  If the “new 
economy” continues to encourage job-shifting and part-time employment, then 
it is reasonable to expect an increase in “peripheral” workers. 
Second, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of health coverage will 
continue to rise relative to background inflation.  There is a recent revival of 
dramatic premium increases.195  The drivers of this resurgence of price 
inflation include the adoption of increasingly expensive technology, the 
escalating use of increasingly expensive drugs and the aging of the 
population.196  These causes of health coverage inflation seem unlikely to 
diminish in the foreseeable future.  Third, as the cost of coverage continues to 
rise, it seems reasonable to assume that employers will continue to exhibit the 
 
 193. See Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 145. 
 194. See Farber & Levy, supra note 31, at 102. 
 195. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 5-7; Levitt et al., supra note 18, at 131-32.  See also 
Stephen Barr, Costs Rise 9% in Federal Health Plans; Third Year in a Row of Big Premium 
Jumps, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at A1. 
 196. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 9-18.  See also Robert W. Dubois et al., Explaining Drug 
Spending Trends: Does Perception Match Reality?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 234-35.  
For seven conditions associated with treatment with pharmaceuticals, the drug treatment costs 
over a three-year study period increased at a level ranging from 43% to 219%.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] MEDICAID EXPANSION 113 
tendency to pass a portion of that increased cost on to employees,197 
specifically in the form of increased cost-sharing for dependent coverage.198  In 
particular, this effect will be felt by employees of smaller businesses and part-
time workers.199 
Fourth, it seems reasonable to assume that the trend of relatively flat 
compensation levels for low-income workers200 will continue, as an 
information-based economy rewards the well-educated and penalizes those 
without education or technical skills.  And fifth, it seems likely that the burden 
of increased cost shifting on low-income workers and workers in small 
businesses, particularly those with a large number of part-time workers, will 
continue to result in a low rate of take-up of offers of employment-based health 
coverage by these workers.201 
Should these predictions prove more or less accurate, there will naturally 
be pressure to continue to expand public programs to provide coverage for the 
uninsured families of the working poor.  Indeed, as Rhode Island worked 
through its budgetary concerns with its comprehensive public insurance 
expansion program, it concluded that the increasing demand for public 
coverage was attributable in large part to the inability of workers to afford 
private coverage.202  The Rhode Island General Assembly concluded that these 
economic factors, rather than cheating by RIte Care enrollees, was the cause of 
the program’s unexpected growth.203 
In recent years, the rate of uninsurance has risen only gradually because 
increases in public programs have masked the deterioration of employment-
based coverage.204  As pressure grows to provide coverage to the working poor 
left uncovered as a result of workplace shifts, public officials are likely to 
follow the thought process evidenced by the Rhode Island General Assembly.  
 
 197. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 17; RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 31-32; Cooper 
& Schone, supra note 27, at 147. 
 198. See RICE ET AL., supra note 34, at 63-64. 
 199. See David Dranove et al., “Competition” Among Employers Offering Health Insurance, 
19 J. HEALTH ECON. 121, 135-38 (2000) (small firms and firms with a high percentage of part-
time workers impose higher cost-sharing burdens on their employees). 
 200. See O’BRIEN & FEDER, supra note 8, at 12; Handler, supra note 25, at 4. 
 201. See Cooper & Schone, supra note 27, at 147 (low-income workers). 
 202. See RIte Care Stabilization Act, supra note 179, § 1(4), (5). 
 203. See text accompanying notes 179-85. 
 204. See Rowland et al., supra note 12 (“The 1988 through 1995 decline in employer-
sponsored coverage would have produced a larger number of uninsured Americans had it not 
been accompanied by an increase in Medicaid coverage.”).  As has previously been noted, the 
apparently temporary flattening of health care cost inflation and historically low rates of inflation 
were associated in the late 1990s with a small increase in employment-based coverage.  See 
Holahan & Kim, supra note 33, at 194.  The possibility that these two factors (historically low 
unemployment and flat health care inflation) will continue into the future for any substantial 
period of time seems quite remote. 
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That path has two components.  First, they will recognize that the pressure on 
public programs is based on the dynamics of the workplace—and principally 
on the growth in the cost of coverage to low-wage employees.205  Second, they 
will come to realize that crowd-out is a complex factor in the consideration of 
public program growth.  As Rhode Island seems to have discovered, crowd-out 
is not a significant cause of the growth pressure on public programs.  Rather, 
crowd-out must be taken into account in program design, in order to assure a 
proper mesh between public and private coverage that both maximizes private 
sector coverage and treats low-income workers equitably.206  If the five 
assumptions discussed above hold, and if officials follow the path set out by 
Rhode Island, then we will experience a steady growth of public programs 
without substantial concern about crowd-out. 207 
In addition to this negative point—that crowd-out is not a barrier to public 
program expansion—there are three positive points related to the crowd-out 
dynamic that suggest an accelerated shift in the health finance balance to 
public programs.  All are related to the fact that the public program expansion 
of the last fifteen years has moved Medicaid and its related programs beyond 
the destitute to the working poor, a progression that is likely to continue as 
public program expansion reaches more and more deeply into the ranks of 
employed Americans. 
The first positive point is that the expansion of public programs may lessen 
the stigma now attached to Medicaid participation.  Insurance coverage is not 
sufficient to provide health care to patients—health care providers must be 
willing to participate in the insurance program and to treat appropriately the 
patients covered by the insurance.208  As public programs expand, they cease to 
be poverty programs, and thereby may shed their image which has caused 
some health care providers to either shun Medicaid recipients or treat them 
with less respect than privately insured patients.  And it works both ways—as 
health care providers cease treating participants in public programs differently, 
 
 205. This pressure will be exacerbated with a downturn in the economy and a drop in the rate 
of employment.  See supra notes 193-95. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 179-85. 
 207. As is noted above, the enrollment dips in public programs related to the uncoupling of 
Medicaid from welfare have eroded public program enrollment.  See UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 63.  The correction of this problem, serious though it is, is 
beyond the scope of this Article, which assumes that the steps suggested in the works described 
above in note 63 can correct this erosion. 
 208. See Sidney Watson, In Search of The Story: Physicians and Charity Care, 15 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (1996); Sara Rosenbaum, Rationing Without Justice: Children and 
the American Health System, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1859, 1874-75 (1992). 
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the program participants will be less inclined to feel that membership in the 
public program sets them out as less than a full member of society.209 
The second positive point is that the intermeshing of public and private 
coverage may aid in establishing greater continuity of coverage for low and 
moderate income Americans.  Workers change jobs, and low-income workers 
shift from private to public coverage as their employment circumstances 
change.210  As the intermeshing of public and private coverage proceeds, low-
income workers are more likely to maintain coverage as their employment 
status changes; the public program subsidy will rise or fall depending on the 
degree of private coverage available in the workplace, but their membership in 
a health plan could remain continuous.  Low-income families would therefore 
“have more reliable access to health coverage and a greater likelihood of 
receiving both preventive and primary health care, leading to improved health 
status.”211 
The third positive point might seem not all that positive to some.  Although 
the Rhode Island experience and the studies of crowd-out associated with prior 
Medicaid expansions suggest that crowd-out ought not be a barrier to public 
program participation, expansions of public programs do appear to displace 
private coverage to some degree.212  This effect is likely to become greater as 
the income levels for public programs increase.213  The Rhode Island response 
to crowd-out did not attempt to eliminate the displacement of private 
coverage—such a result would have been inequitable for those low-income 
workers with inadequate private coverage, or private coverage associated with 
crushing levels of cost-sharing.  Rhode Island’s remedial steps therefore 
balanced an interest in protecting private coverage with a desire to treat low-
income workers equitably.  Crowd-out, then, may be minimized, but it cannot 
be eliminated.  Crowd-out will, therefore, accelerate the expansion of public 
programs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The expansion of Medicaid and related public programs responds to a 
pressing need.  Shifts in the labor economy have diminished the extent to 
which workers—particularly low-income workers in new or part-time 
employment—are covered by traditional employment-related health coverage.  
States and the federal government have responded in the last fifteen years by 
 
 209. See Jennifer P. Stuber et al., Beyond Stigma: What Barriers Actually Affect the Decisions 
of Low-Income Families to Enroll in Medicaid? 7 (July 2000), available at http://www.hfni. 
gsehd.gwu.edu/#chsrp/pdf/stig.pdf. 
 210. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 63, at 16. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102. 
 213. See Blumberg et al., supra note 79, at 58. 
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expanding public programs to attempt to stem the tide of uninsurance.  
Legislators have raised concerns that such expansions of public programs from 
the ranks of the destitute to the working poor will crowd-out private coverage. 
Crowd-out has manifested in Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and it will occur in the context of present and future expansions.  
It arises in part, however, because the employment-based insurance system has 
changed; the cost-sharing imposed on low-income workers, and particularly 
those with new and part-time jobs, can exceed their ability to pay.  Their 
inclination to “drop” private coverage is therefore understandable, and anti-
displacement measures that subsidize low-income workers’ cost-sharing 
burdens must become a standard part of public program expansions. 
Public and private coverage, then, has become enmeshed in two ways.  
First, these two parts of our health insurance system, once geared to entirely 
different populations, now substantially overlap at the level of low- and 
moderate-income workers.  Second, these low- and moderate-income workers 
will increasingly, in response to concerns for crowd-out, be served by a hybrid 
system, in which their coverage is financed in part by their employer, and in 
part by a public program.  The trajectory of workplace economics and the 
rising cost of health coverage suggest that the dominance of the private 
insurance system in America will continue to diminish, as public programs 
move into the business of covering low- and moderate-income workers.  Under 
reasonable assumptions about the future cost of health care and the American 
labor market, this trend can be anticipated to lead to a transformation of 
America’s mixed public-private health insurance system from one dominated 
by private coverage to one in which public coverage is the norm. 
 
